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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRANT M. ROBERTSON and EDITH
WILLIAMS ROBERTSON, aka EDITH L.
ROBERTSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

l

vs.

DONALD W. GEIS; SLOAN SMITH;
SLOAN SMITH ASSOCIATES LTD.; FIRST
DIVIDEND CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, and INTERMOUNTAIN
CAPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH,
Defendants and Appellants,
and
INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL
CORPORATION OF UTAH, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appelltmt,

CaeNo.
12902

vs.

JOHN W. ROBERTSON and ZELDA
ROBERTSON, his wife,
Third-Party Defendants and Repondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

GRANT M. ROBERTSON AND EDITH WILLIAMS
ROBERTSON aka EDITH L. ROBERTSON, HIS WIFE

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

JOHN W. ROBERTSON AND ZELDA ROBERTSON, HIS
WIFE THIRD·PAR1Y DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by the plaintiffs against the defendants Donald W. Geis and Sloan Smith for damages for
fraud and as against the defendant Intermountain Capital
Company to void and set aside a mortgage said company
had as against certain real property owned by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding,
granted the plaintiffs judgment for damages for fraud as
against defendants Donald W. Geis and Sloan Smith and a
judgment in plaintiffs' favor and also in third-party defendants' favor voiding and setting aside the mortgage on
their real property that had been held by defendant Inter.
mountain Capital Corporation of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs Grant M. Robertson and Edith Robertson,
his wife, and third-party defendants John W. Robertson
and Zelda Robertson, his wife, seek an affirmance on this
appeal of that judgment entered by the trial court on
March 31, 1972 (R. 240 through 242).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The brief of defendant Intermountain Capital Corpo·
ration heretofore filed only recites part of the facts appli·
cable to the appeal and those which relate to its contro·
versy with the plaintiffs and third-party defendants. In·
asmuch as other defendants, Donald W. Geis and Sloan
Smith, have also appealed and because their involvement
is closely related factually to that of Intermountain Capi·
tal's, the pertinent facts will be restated in this brief. The
parties will either be referred to by name (sometimes not
their entire name as e.g. Intermountain) or by their party
designation in the trial court.
2

This case is quite complicated factually and its trial
to the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, sitting without a jury,
lasted the better part of three days and covered some 500
pages of trial transcript. It commenced on October 28,
1971 (R. 286). Following the trial itself, most of the
parties submitted detailed memorandum relating to the
facts and legal issues involved and several post-trial hearings on motions were heard. After these involved proceedings and on March 31, 1972, Judge Croft signed the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R.
226 through 242). Since the trial court found in favor of
the plaintiffs and third-party defendants and against the
defendants Geis, Smith and Intermountain, the facts recited herein will be stated favorably to the position of the
prevailing parties and will be similar to those recited in
the formal Findings of Facts since all such findings were
amply supported by the evidence in the record.
Mr. Grant M. Robertson and his wife, Edith, are an
elderly couple who have lived for many years at 1548
Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 289). In 1949
they acquired some eight and one-half acres of unimproved real property situated generally at 7690 South 10th
East in Salt Lake County (R. 290). Most of this property
forms the subject matter of this lawsuit. In 1954, Mr. and
Mrs. Grant M. Robertson conveyed by warranty deed a
four by seven rod parcel from this larger tract to their son
and daughter-in-law, the third party defendants, John W.
Robertson and Zelda Robertson (R. 292). Prior to 1954
a dwelling and garage had been constructed partially on
this four by seven rod parcel and it was then and is now
the dwelling of the son and daughter-in-law and their
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family (R. 290 through 292). For various reasons, this
garage and dwelling were constructed so they straddled
the property line and were one-half on the property deeded to them and one-half on the property retained by Mr.
and Mrs. Grant M. Robertson and which was later mortgaged to lntermountain Capital (R. 292). Because of the
latter fact, lntermountain Capital joined the son and daughter-in-law as parties to this lawsuit and as part of their
attempt to foreclose the mortgage on this property. Had
the trial court not voided the mortgage and had it instead
allowed lntermountain Capital to foreclose, one of the
results would have been to have the son and daughter·
in-law ending up without title to approximately one-half
of the property on which their family home is situated
(R. 292). This fact also has significance in that the 1963
warranty deed from Mr. and Mrs. Grant M. Robertson to
Donald W. Geis, which eventually resulted in the mort·
gage to Intermountain Capital, made no exclusion or ex·
ception for the earlier recorded conveyance to the son and
daughter-in-law (Ex. 1-P). Prior to granting the mortgage,
Intermountain Capital's president and chief executive
officer, John M. Whiteley, who was himself an exper·
ienced real estate broker (R. 640), personally inspected the
eight and one-half acre parcel, in the company of Sloan
Smith, and noted that this dwelling had been built thereon
(R. 664). Before lntermountain made its loan, Mr. White·
ley or his attorneys had been furnished with a copy of
the deed (Ex. 1-P). No inquiry was ever made by Mr.
Whiteley as to what this dwelling was doing on this
property prior to the $60,000.00 mortgage loan by his corn·
pany (R. 665). By Mr. Whiteley's own admission, he saw
this dwelling on the property and either knew or should
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have known that the deed upon which his company's
mortgage was based (Ex. 1-P) made no exclusion, and yet
that no improvements thereon had been conveyed or were
being mortgaged. This alone should have caused him to
make inquiry. Had such been made, Whiteley would
definitely have discovered the Robertsons' interest in the
property, their transactions with Donald W. Geis and
Sloan Smith and he would thereby have fully apprised
himself and lntermountain of the fraudulent nature of
what was transpiring and which had induced the Robertsons to deed the property in the first place. Of course,
these facts were unnecessary to the trial court's decision
since it found Whiteley and lntermountain actually knew
before its mortgage and $60,000.00 loan of most of the
arrangements between the Robertsons and Geis and Smith
since the latter had told Whiteley of these arrangements
(R. 232, 233). However, the facts recited above may alone
have prevented Intermountain from being a bona fide
mortgagee for value and without notice and even without
this other evidence concerning Whiteley and Intermountain' s extensive knowledge as to arrangements between the
Robertsons and Geis and Smith.
Donald W. Geis was a neighbor of Mr. and Mrs.
Grant M. Robertson and the Robertsons and Mr. Geis
and his wife had become very close and, on many occasions,
the Robertsons had looked after the young children of the
Geis'. During this time and during the events in question involving the Robertsons (R. 297, 298) which transpired mainly in 1963, Mr. Geis was the agent of Sloan
Smith (R. 443). At this same time Mr. Smith was promoting, among many other ventures, a scheme involving
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the sale or financing of used equipment in Central America. In essence, this scheme involved an attempt by Geis
and Smith and the latter's corporations, to obtain from
investors, most of whom were in Salt Lake County, cash
or unencumbered property (which could then be used as
collateral and cash obtained for it), with the cash then to
be used by Smith and his corporations to obtain in the
United States various used equipment which was then
to be transported to Central America to be financed or
sold there, allegedly at a tremendous profit (R. 302
through 307). From these profits that were supposed to be
obtained, it was represented that the investors, including
the Robertsons, were to obtain a substantial return (R.
309).
Based on these representations about the Central
American venture as well as a number of other representa·
tions that will be referred to hereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Grant
M. Robertson conveyed to Donald W. Geis by warranty
deed dated May 2, 1963, the eight and one-half acres of
property involved in this case (Ex. 1-P). Shortly there·
after, but as part of the same transaction, Mr. and Mrs.
Robertson signed and delivered to Geis for Sloan Smith,
a document entitled "Memorandum Trust Agreement"
(Ex. 2-P).
Thereafter, a number of transactions occurred with
respect to this property and related matters which were not
disclosed to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson by anyone until a
number of months later. Some time prior to August 17,
1963, Mr. Geis deeded this eight and one-half acres to a
newly formed Utah corporation named First Dividend
Corporation (R. 630). This corporation had been formed
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during that summer at the instance of Sloan Smith and
John M. Whiteley, the president of Intermountain Capital (R. 471). On August 17, 1963, Intermountain Capital
loaned to First Dividend Corporation the sum of $60,000.00 and took as security for its repayment, a mortgage
on the eight and one-half acres, in addition to other collateral (Ex. 24-P). By deed dated August 5, 1964, First
Dividend deeded back to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson the eight
and one-half acres subject to the mortgage to lntermountain Capital (Ex. 3-P). This was the first that the Robertsons knew about the involvement of lntermountain Capital although it was not until some time after that when
they learned any substantial details about what had occurred (R. 349 through 354).
The agreement between Geis for Smith and the
Robertsons contemplated, among other terms, that the
eight and one-half acres would be used to obtain money
for the Central American venture and that in return, the
Robertsons would receive periodic payments and that
eventually, and in a period not to exceed ten years, that the
property would cease to be used as collateral and would
be returned to the Robertsons free and clear (Ex. 2-P).
When none of these periodic payments were forthcoming
to the Robertsons, they began investigating the circumstances and, after being largely thwarted in finding out
anything for themselves from the other parties involved,
hired legal counsel and on October 25, 1968 this lawsuit
was commenced (R. 1 through 6).
As noted above, this fact situation is quite a complicated one, and it is not deemed necessary to burden this
brief with all or even most of the details as to what oc7

curred between Geis and Smith on one side and Mr. and
Mrs. Robertson on the other side. The trial court did find
by clear and convincing evidence that as a result of these
transactions, Geis and Smith committed all of the elements
necessary to constitute actionable fraud as against the
Robertsons and that as the result thereof the Robertsons
deeded their property to Geis (R. 229 through 232). As
the factual basis for its finding of fraud, the trial court
found that Geis for Smith made a number of misrepre·
sentations to the Robertsons, all of which were false either
wholly or in material part, that these representations were
material and were made to induce the Robertsons to part
with the eight and one-half acres and that the Robertsons
justifiably relied thereon in deeding the property to Geis.
In substance, these misrepresentations were as follows
with a brief summary of wherein they were false follow·
ing in parenthesis.
A. That the property would be used by Geis and
Smith as collateral to borrow money to invest in a busi·
ness of buying used equipment and then reselling the
same in Central America and that the proceeds obtained
from a loan secured by the property would not be used for
any other purpose whatsoever ( R. 3 11). (In fact, most of
the proceeds from the $60,000.00 loan were not used for
that purpose (Ex. 22-P) and the evidence was such that the
trial court was justified in concluding that Geis and Smith
never intended to exclusively use the money for that pur·
pose.)
B. That the eight and one-half acres would be con·
veyed to Geis for a maximum of ten years and on or be·
fore the expiration of ten years from the time of the con·
8

vcyance, the property would be conveyed back to the
plaintiffs free and clear of all encumbrances (R. 628). (In
fact, Geis and Smith knew when this representation was
made that the property would be later used as collateral
on an unlimited basis. That is, they were then contemplating mortgaging it to lntermountain or some other lender
and there was nothing in the loan agreement with Intermountain insisting that the property not be used as collateral beyond the ten years Ex. 24-P).
Geis and Smith agreed to pay to the Robertsons
for the use of their property for this period not to exceed
ten years, a minimum of $2,500.00 per year, less the property taxes (R. 309, 314). (In fact, Geis and Smith never
paid the Robertsons one dime except $300.00 on their
property taxes. While this representation may sound more
promissory than fraudulent, the evidence of what Smith
was, in fact, making and of what he was doing with the
money invested, justified the trial court in believing that
this wasn't just a grandiose promise made that couldn't
later be kept, but was rather a false statement when made
since Smith then knew he would never keep it.)
C.

D. That no mortgage or lien would be placed
against the property encumbering it for more than $25,000.00 (R. 314, 315). (In fact, Geis and Smith knew at the
time that they were going to use the property as collateral
for a loan of $60,000.00, or more, and within four
months of obtaining it a loan for $60,000.00 was obtained
with this property as part of the security (Ex. 24-P)
E. That at any time during the ten years, the plaintiffs could request that one or more lots of the eight and
one-half acres could be withdrawn from whatever security
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arrangement encumbered it and that no security arrange.
ment would be entered into affecting the property where
these withdrawals could not be made (R. 315). (In fact,
Geis and Smith, and considering their sophistication, had
to have known no lender would take the property as collateral on this kind of a release arrangement. Moreover,
when the loan from Intermountain was entered into there
was no attempt to provide for such a release arrangement.)
F. That the plaintiffs were "absolutely safe" in
entering into this arrangement with their property (R.
626, 627). (Considering their circumstances at the time,
(i.e. in part the lack of success until then and the tre·
mendous amounts they were obligating themselves to re·
pay) Geis and Smith could not possibly have honestly
believed the Robertsons' investment was "absolutely
safe.")
G. That Geis and Smith were already extremely
successful in the used equipment business in Central
America and already had made and were making large
profits from this business (R. 628). (In fact, the evidence
indicated Geis and Smith had no success up to that time
in this venture.)
H. That in addition to the large profits being made
in the Central American used equipment business, that
Smith had been successful in other ventures and that he
was a wealthy man and that his resources would insure
performance to the plaintiffs on their agreement (R.
(In fact, the evidence showed that Smith had no real fl·
nancial substance of his own and his only substance was
his glib tongue and borrowed assets.)
10

That other persons had made similar investments
and had already been paid large profits by Geis and Smith
and that the plaintiffs would succeed as these other investors had (R. 304 through 307, 626 through 628). (In fact,
no one made anything investing with Geis and Smith. To
the contrary, their experiences were similar to that of the
Robertsons.)
I.

J.

Plaintiffs were not told that a corporation would
be formed and that the property would be conveyed to this
corporation in return for stock which went to Smith nor
were they told that this corporation would then obtain the
loan and use the property as collateral for it (R. 638). (In
fact, the Robertsons were told the loan would be made
through a bank in Central America or, as their agent,
through a New York bank (R. 316).
The trial court made no finding that lntermountain
Capital was itself guilty of fraud as against the Robertsons. Rather, it found, in substance, that there was an
unusually close association between Intermountain Capital, through its president John M. Whiteley, and Geis
and particularly Sloan Smith. The trial court further
found that prior to parting with its $60,000.00 to First
Dividend and taking the mortgage on the Robertsons'
property, that Mr. Whiteley and lntermountain Capital
were aware of a number of facts and circumstances that
precluded lntermountain Capital from claiming it was a
bona fide mortgagee for value and without notice, and as
to this eight and one-half acres. Based on these same facts,
the trial court concluded that Geis and Smith obtained the
Robertson's property to hold in trust and that since Whiteley and lntermountain knew of the material portions of
11

•
this trust arrangement, Intermountain' s mortgage was
subject to the trust (R. 236). Among these facts and cir.
cumstances showing the relationship of these parties and
supporting the trial court's findings and conclusions, are
the following:
A. Well in advance of the August 17, 1963, $60,.
000.00 loan of Intermountain to First Dividend, John M.
Whiteley had not only gone to the Robertson property
with Sloan Smith to look at it, but he had actually been
given a copy of the Memorandum Trust Agreement (Ex.
2-P) and had been advised by Smith that this was the basis
upon which the property had been obtained from the
Robertsons (R. 479, 480, 488). Smith testified to the
foregoing at the trial although Whiteley denied having
seen Exhibit 2-P. On this disputed evidence, the trial court
believed Smith and found that Whiteley had seen this
document prior to the date of the loan and that therefore
he and, of course, Intermountain Capital, knew about its
contents prior to parting with the $60,000.00. Among its
other terms, Exhibit 2-P provides that the property could
not be used as collateral beyond ten years, and that at the
conclusion of that time, Mrs. Robertson had the option of
having the property deeded back to her free and clear of
encumbrances.
B. In addition to finding that Mr. Whiteley had
actually seen Exhibit 2-P, the trial court found that Smith
had told Whiteley all of the following before the loan
was made: That Smith and his companies needed money
to finance the used equipment business in Central America
(R. 403); that Smith and Geis were obtaining property of
one kind or another from various investors and they in·
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tended to use these properties to obtain financing for the
business in Central America (R. 469, 670; that Geis was a
neighbor to the plaintiffs and had a close personal relationship with them and that they owned the unimproved
eight and one-half acres free and clear (R. 479); that based
on Geis' discussion with plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had conveyed this eight and one-half acres to Geis to be used for
security purposes to raise money but that Geis had told
the plaintiffs that the property would not be used for that
purpose for more than ten years and that within that time
the property would be reconveyed to the plaintiffs free
and clear (R. 480); that the property was worth at least
$25,000.00 and that nothing had been paid to the plaintiffs for the property except the plaintiffs were to receive
annual payments during the time the property was being
used (R. 479).
C. Prior to August 17, 1963, Mr. Whiteley was
shown the deed of the Robertsons to Geis (Ex. 1-P), and
he would therefore have been aware that no exclusion
was contained on that deed (R. 487, 488). Also, prior to
the time of the loan, Mr. Whiteley inspected the property
and saw the dwelling thereon and later and before August
17, 1963 learned that a four by seven rod parcel had been
earlier conveyed (R. 665). Nevertheless, Mr. Whiteley
and Intermountain Capital made no inquiry nor did they
attempt to contact the residents of the dwelling or the
Robertsons concerning the transaction (R. 66 5).
D. Commencing in 1961 and from time to time continuing up to August 17, 1963, Smith and Whiteley were
involved in various business deals together including the
one in question (R. 460, 461). In fact, in 1961 or 1962
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Whiteley personally had invested $500.00 with Sloan
Smith in another venture (R. 388). They also saw each
other a good deal socially during this same period of time
and continuing after that date they were associates socially
and in business matters (R. 399).

E. First Dividend Corporation was incorporated at
the insistance of Whiteley and Intermountain and in order
to enable Intermountain Capital to make the loan to a
domestic corporation (R. 471). This was so because Inter.
mountain Capital was a so-called "SBIC or Small Invest·
ment Business Corporation", utilizing some capital ob·
tained from the federal government, and it was essential
that the $60,000.00 loan be made to a domestic corpora·
ti on.
F. Intermountain Capital stood to gain if the $60,·
000.00 loan to First Dividend was successful in that the
loan agreement granted lntermountain a warrant or op·
tion to purchase at a favorable price up to 20% of First
Dividend's authorized stock (R. 653). This was, of course,
in addition to the 10% interest charged First Dividend
by Intermountain on the loan and which was a very good
rate at that time (R. 673).
G. John M. Whiteley's brother, Winslow B. White·
ley, was a large investor in Intermountain Capital and
also had an interest in Whiteley Properties, another corpo·
ration that had a substantial interest in Intermountain
Capital during this period of time. In effect, and through
personal holdings and his interest in Whiteley Properties,
Winslow B. Whiteley's interest in Intermountain was ap·
proximately 20% of its outstanding stock (R. 641, 642).
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Winslow B. Whiteley was a director of First Dividend
from its inception through the period of time that Intermountain on August 17, 1963 made the $60,000.00 loan
to it and at that same time he was a director of Intermountain (R. 643, 675). The name of Winslow B. Whiteley
had been used prominently by Geis in his convincing the
plaintiffs to transfer their property and in that the plaintiffs had been told that he was a rich potato farmer who
had invested $125,000.00 in the same venture (R. 305).
H. Sloan Smith had a financial interest in Intermountain Capital prior to the time the loan was made
and at the time it was made on August 17, 1963. He had
been listed as a subscriber for $25,000.00 of its stock but
hadn't come up with the money although he had, in effect,
invested $10,000.00 in that company.
I. It was evident from the testimony at the trial
that John M. Whiteley had only the most superficial
knowledge of the true facts relating to Geis, Smith and
the latter's companies prior to making the loan and that
he knew nothing verified or concrete to indicate that
Smith was a man of financial substance (R. 654 through
659). About all he knew about Smith's financial situation
prior to the loan being made were that Smith had several
new cars, that he was flying around in a two-engine airplane and that he had a large home. Any kind of reasonable investigation by Whiteley and Intermountain would
have disclosed that Smith could not have obtained the
eight and one-half acres free and clear without some
underlying agreement that sharply restricted its alienability.
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J. During July, 1963, Whiteley told Smith that
Intermountain would loan First Dividend the $60,000.00
and provided that there was adequate security and that
his board was satisfied with the security (R. 487). On one
or more occasions prior to the loan being made, Whiteley
prepared in his own hand a trial balance showing First
Dividends asset including the plaintiffs' property which
showed an asset value to First Dividend of $24,000.00
and Whiteley went back to his board and advised them
that these assets were to be the security for the loan (R.
659). Also prior to the loan being made by Intermountain,
Whiteley knew that nothing had been paid to the plaintiffs for the conveyance of this property and that any con·
sideration they would receive would have to come to them
in the manner set forth in Exhibit 2-P (R. 479, 480). In
other words, Whiteley and Intermountain Capital knew
prior to the loan being made that the real party in interest
to the property was the plaintiffs and that, in fact, Smith
and First Dividend Corporation, in their own right, had
no real interest in the property.
K. Virtually no collection efforts were made by
Intermountain Capital against either First Dividend,
Smith or the plaintiffs and after the loan became quickly
in default. The foreclosure proceedings itself was not
commenced until some five or six months after this lawsuit
was filed in October of 1968 (R. 44 through 72). From
November of 1964 until the foreclosure proceedings were
commenced in May of 1969, no cash payments were made
by anyone on this loan although Sloan Smith did make
a $2,500.00 payment by check in January, 1965, but the
check "bounced" (Ex. 18-P). Intermountain Capital's ap·
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parent lack of desire to collect or foreclose in connection with this property is some indication of Intermountain' s guilty involvement with Geis and Smith. By contrast, consider what a true bona fide mortgagee would
have done in the event of the kind of default that existed
here.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL TOOK THE
MORTGAGE ON THE ROBERTSON PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ROBERTSONS AND GEIS AND SMITH AND CANNOT QUALIFY AS A BONA FIDE MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE.
Under Point I of its brief, lntermountain Capital
argues that the Robertsons knowingly conveyed the property and agreed in writing to the placing of an encumbrance thereon and that therefore they cannot avoid the
rights of Intermountain who thereafter advanced monies
and received back a mortgage in accordance with the
terms of that agreement. To some extent, the foregoing
is correct. That is, the plaintiffs did convey their property knowing an encumbrance would be placed thereon,
although the manner in which this was done was different
than they had been told. However, in conveying the property to Geis, the plaintiffs did so subject to the Memorandum Trust Agreement (Ex. 2-P) and also, as far as Geis
and Smith were concerned, subject to a number of other
oral conditions. On somewhat disputed evidence the trial
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court chose to believe that Intermountain, through its
president Whiteley, not only saw this agreement prior to
making its loan, but that Whiteley was advised of most
of these other oral conditions by Smith. In other words ,
the trial court found that at the time Intermountain Capi.
tal parted with its money, it knew, among other terms as
between Smith and Geis and the Robertsons that the
property had to be conveyed back to the Robertsons free
and dear no later than within ten years, (i.e. by May 1,
1973) and that it couldn't be used to secure a larger loan
than $25,000.00. Clearly, where Intermountain Capital
had actual know ledge of these terms, as the court found,
it could not take a mortgage on the property and ignore
those terms as it has sought to do in this litigation.
It is true that the Robertsons never recorded Exhibit
2-P nor any other document evidencing their agreement
with Geis and Smith. However, the purpose of recording
a document in a real property transaction is to attempt to
give later purchasers or mortgagees actual notice and in
the event a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee doesn't
actually learn of the recorded document, he is legally
deemed to have knowledge of it based on a theory of "con·
structi ve notice". In this case recording would have done
nothing more than occurred, since the court found White·
ley and therefore Intermountain Capital actually knew
of these terms and the evidence amply supports that find·
mg.

Webster, et al v. Knop, et al., 6 U.2d 273, 312 P.2d
557 (Utah 1957) involved a somewhat similar situation.
In the Webster case, one of the defendants Knop and the
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two plaintiffs, Lloyd and Carl Webster, had entered into
a written grubstake agreement whereby, subject to various terms, the three of them agreed to share one-third
each in any claims staked pursuant to their contract.
Thereafter, the claims in question were staked in the names
of Knop and the two Websters, but by reason of the applicable law at that time, the location of these claims was
invalid and vested nothing in the three locators. Subsequently, and under circumstances where the law had
changed and the location was valid, Knop relocated the
claims in his own name. Still later, Knop attempted to
transfer the entire interest in these claims, and free of any
interest in the Websters, to two other persons, Davis and
Shwnway.
The evidence further indicated in the Webster case
that Davis and Shumway had, before purchasing these
claims from Knop, obtained a title search and the opinion
of two attorneys to the effect that the original location was
invalid, the relocation was valid and that therefore the
sole interest was in Knop. The plaintiffs Webster commenced the suit to quiet title as against Knop, Davis and
Shumway and others to their two-thirds interest in these
claims and they comended that Davis and Shumway could
not be bona fide purchasers for value and without notice
by reason of the knowledge they had or should have had
prior to the transfer from Knop.
In this regard, and at page 558 of 312 P.2d, the court
stated as follows:

Prior to the purchase of the claims in question
by the defendants Davis and Shumway, both had
notice of the invalid first location, having found
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the records of notice of location and amended
notice in the County Recorder's Office. These were
filed under the names of Knop, and the two plain.
tiffs Webster. The defendants Davis and Shum.
way also had actual notice of the grubstake agreement under the terms of which the original location was made. Nevertheless though having been
apprised of a possibility of a claim of interest in
the mining claims they did not seek out the plaintiffs in this action to inquire if they claimed an
interest. Rather, they relied on two title opinions
by two attorneys to the effect that since the original
location was invalid and since the grubstake agreement had lapsed before the relocation, such reloca·
tion in the name of John J. Knop was valid and
exclusive.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that under
these circumstances and with this prior notice and knowl·
edge, Davis and Shumway could be bona fide purchasers
for value from Knop. In affirming the trial court's find·
ing quieting title to two-thirds interest in the two Web·
sters the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The second question is: Were the subsequent
transferees having notice of the grubstake agree·
ment and the original location in the names of the
three parties to the agreement bona fide purchasers
for value from the one who relocated so as to
terminate the equitable constructive trust interest
m the beneficiaries?
The equitable interest of a trust in the bene·
ficiaries may be cut off as against a bona fide
chaser for value from the trustee or constructive
trustee. He must have had no notice, actual or con·
structive, and he must pay value. Peterson :·
Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135. As stated in
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the Restatement, Restitution, § 12(a), adopted in
the Peterson case:
'A person has notice of facts giving rise
to a constructive trust not only when he
knows them, but also when he should know
them; that is when he knows facts which
would lead a reasonably intelligent and diligent person to inquire whether there are circumstances which would give rise to a constructive trust, and if such inquiry when pursued with reasonable intelligence and diligence would give him knowledge or reason
to know of such circumstances.'

When the defendants Davis and Shumway
entered into agreements for the purchase of the
Faith Claims, they knew of the prior location and
the parties named as colocators. This alone should
have put them on notice that an inquiry should be
made of the original colocators. Even though value
was paid, reliance cannot in such a case be made
entirely on title opinions. A title opinion cannot
be sufficient to satisfy a duty to inquire as to
possible equitable interest any more than it can
without inquiry as to rights of parties in possession.
When this fact is added to the fact that they knew
of the existence of a prior grubstake agreement, a
duty of diligent inquiry arose. Failure in this duty
is failure of an element of good faith.
In the instant case we are definitely not dealing with
a lender such as a bank or savings and loan association
and where that lender has parted with its money having
no notice or knowledge of some secret arrangement between its mortgagor and an earlier transferor. If that were
the case and where the lender is unaware of such arrangements, the courts have held and should hold in favor of
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the innocent mortgagee. This is not the situation in the
instant case, and it is clear from the evidence and con.
sidering the relationship between John M. Whiteley and
Sloan Smith that, in effect, Intermountain Capital and
First Dividend became something like partners in this
Central American venture. More important, Intermountain Capital through its president had actual knowledge
of the arrangements relating to the property between the
Robertson on one hand and Geis and Smith on the other
hand and it would be unconscionable and contrary to law
to say that under those circumstances they could cut off
the Robertsons from the benefit of those agreements.
It is to be noted that in the Webster v. Knop case,
the Supreme Court indicates that the transferee would not
qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value where he should
have known of the facts, but didn't actually know of them.
In the instant case the record is replete with facts and cir·
cumstances showing that lntermountain Capital should
have known all about the transaction and that it acted
with recklessness in making this loan and taking this mort·
gage under the circumstances under which it did even
without actual knowledge. However, we do not need to
rely upon what should have been known by Intermoun·
tain Capital since the court expressly found that it actually
knew the key terms as between Geis and Smith and the
Robertsons and particularly the crucial one that the prop·
erty had to be returned within ten years.
Another Utah Supreme Court case somewhat in point
is Schow, et ttx. v. Gttardtone, Inc., et al., 18 U.2d 135,
417 P.2d 643 (Utah 1966). In the Schow case the plaintiffs
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Schow, who were homeowners, had contracted with
Guardtone, Inc. for the purchase of an intercommunication and fire alarm system. Thereafter, the contract was
assigned to Prudential Federal Savings, who was also one
of the defendants in the lawsuit brought by the Schows
to invalidate the contract and to avoid the assignment.
The jury had found that Guardtone had defrauded
the plaintiffs but the trial court had set that finding aside.
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict, and on the subject of Prudential's rights as the assignee of the contract, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
We turn to a consideration of the rights of the
assignee, the defendant Prudential Federal Savings.
It is pertinent to observe that the fraud having
been established to avoid the contract with Guardtone, the burden of showing that it was an innocent purchaser for value was upon Prudential. In
regard thereto there are certain aspects of the evidence which are pertinent to consider. The first
of these is that the 'Home Modernization Contract'
is a printed form which, in the usual 'fine print'
includes the name of Prudential Federal Savings
as the assignee. Similarly, it recites that the
assignee accepts the contract 'with recourse.'
These circumstances might reasonably lead one to
believe that the assignee had something to do with
the planning of this transaction and knew the
facts concerning the collateral contracts, and that
it was advisedly attempting to avoid any involvement of itself therein, but without regard to what
effect those contracts may have upon the purchasers. Finally, and most important, is the fact
that there was a substantial alteration on the face
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of the assigned contract in the name of the payee,
from Guardtone of Utah to Guardtone, Inc., a circumstance which should put a prudent purchaser
on inquiry. No such inquiry was made.
From the facts recited herein it is our opinion
that there is a basis in the evidence upon which the
jury could fairly and reasonably refuse to believe
that the defendant Prudential Federal was an innocent purchaser and which supports the conclusion
that it was bound by the judgment rescinding the
contract for fraud. We have heretofore pointed
out the importance of affording parties who de·
sire it a trial by jury; and that the courts should
exercise caution and reluctance in interferring with
them. It is our view that the judgment should be
in accordance with the jury verdict and the case
is remanded for that purpose.
In the instant case the court found that the property
was obtained by fraud from the Robertsons. Moreover,
it is submitted that the evidence in the instant case is far
stronger that lntermountain was not a bona fide or inno·
cent mortgagee than was the evidence against Prudential's
innocent assignee status in the Schow case. It is also to be
noted that the court in the Schow case indicates that fraud
having been established, that the burden was on the
assignee to show that it was an innocent purchaser for
value. In the instant case, the trial court did not go that
far, but rather put the burden of proof upon the plain·
tiffs. Even having done so, it still found that Intermoun·
tain Capital was not an innocent mortgagee for value and
without notice or that in the alternative that a trust had
been established by which Smith held the property and
that lntermountain took subject to the terms of that trust.
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Under Point I of its brief, Intermountain Capital
appears to attach some significance to the fact that the
Robertsons held the Memorandum Trust Agreement (Ex.
2-P) for a few days before they signed it and that they
ultimately did sign even though certain changes promised
by Geis had not been incorporated into it. Intermountain's
brief does not point out just what these supposed changes
were supposed to have been or what difference they are
supposed to make in this case. As a matter of fact, the
Robertsons did wait a few days before signing the agreement, but there should be no significance to that fact insofar as the outcome of this case is concerned. The agreement as signed plus the oral misrepresentations that the
court found that Geis made and of which Whiteley was
Z,';;are before his company loaned the money, are more
than ample to justify the trial court's decision that Intermountain Capital was not a bona fide mortgagee for value
and without notice or its alternative decision on a trust
theory.
In its brief, Intermountain cites four cases generally
fer the proposition that where one of two innocent parties
must suffer, the loss should fall on the one who created
the circwnst'.lnces making it possible for the wrong to be
accomplished. These cases cited by Intermountain were:
Allred v. Hinkley, 8 U.2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958); Harrison v. Auto Security Company, 70 U. 11, 257 P.677 (1927);
Leherberg v. Felopulous, 248 N.E. 2d 648 (1969) and
Lesser v. Strubbe, 171 A.2d 114 (1961). Plaintiffs have no
quarrel with that proposition and, as stated above in this
brief, it acknowledges that if Intermountain had, in fact,
been innocent that the Robertsons rather than it should
'
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bear the loss. The facts in the instant case are completelv
different from any of those in the four cases just cited and
they therefore offer no precedent for deciding this case.

POINT

II

PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS GEIS AND SMITH, BASED
ON FRAUD, IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
The trial court granted plaintiffs a judgment against
the defendants Donald W. Geis and Sloan Smith, based
on their fraud as against the plaintiffs, for $3,758.31 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from De·
cember 15, 1964 to the date of judgment and thereafter
at the rate of 8% per annum. The trial court arrived at
that particular figure based on the following computation.
It found that said defendants Geis and Smith had agreed
to pay the plaintiffs $2,500.00 per year, less the prop·
erty taxes, during the period of time that the plaintiffs'
property was deeded to them. This period went from May
2, 1963 when the property was deeded to Geis until De·
cember 15, l 964 when First Dividend recorded the deed
back to the plaintiffs, subject to the Intermountain mort·
gage. During this period of time, the defendants had paid
$300 for taxes. Computing the amount due at an annual
rate of $2,500.00, there would be due to the plaintiffs a
total of $4,058.31 and subtracting the $300.00 paid for
property taxes, left the amount of $3,758.31, for which
amount the court granted the plaintiffs' judgment.
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The trial court also provided in its judgment that if,
as a result of any appeal, the judgment voiding the Intermountain mortgage was itself set aside, that then the
plaintiffs would be granted an additional judgment
against the defendants Geis and Smith for $42,500.00.
Obviously, and under the damage rule for fraud that will
be hereafter referred to, the plaintiffs' damages as against
the defendants Geis and Smith would be increased in that
amount and in the event that this court reversed plaintiffs'
judgment against lntermountain and plaintiffs thereby
lost the property.

On this particular point, the defendant lntermountzin states in its brief on page eight that the "lower court
anticipated that his decision concerning the validity of
the mortgage might be overturned" by providing this
additional amount of $42,500.00 in damages and in the
even: that its decision voiding the mortgage were set aside
by th1s court. It is submitted that it is unfair to state that
the trial court "anticipated" any such result. As noted above
under Point I of this brief, the trial court's decision to
void the mortgage is amply supported by the law and
the evidence and, in fact, and considering the findings of
fact that the trial court made upon the disputed evidence,
this was the only decision it could have made. Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic for the trial judge to suppose
that he was infallible and that no part of his decision could
be reversed or altered on appeal. Since it is possible that
? 11 or part of the decision could be reversed, that being
the prerogative of this court, the trial court was prudent
enough to provide what the damages would be in the
e''ent of a reversal.
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It further bears statement on this subject matter that
the plaintiffs and third-party defendants' main interest
in this litigation from its inception has been to void Inter.
mountain's mortgage as against their property. For reasons that must be apparent to the court upon a review of
the record and a reflection upon the testimony of defendants Geis and Smith, any judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and as against those persons is undoubtedly worthless.

Counsel for plaintiffs acknowledges that in proving
a claim for fraud that there are a number of elements, all
of which must be proven, and that the burden is upon the
one claiming the fraud to prove the same by clear and
convincing evidence. In the case of Stuck v. Delta Land &
Water Co., 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, the court set forth the
basic elements of a fraud case and these elements have
been adhered to by the Utah Supreme Court since that
time. These elements are: "(1) a representation; (2) its
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; ( 5) his intent that it
should be acted upon by the person and in the manner
reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; (8) his right to rely
thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury." See
also Pace v. Parrish, 122 U. 141, 247 P.2d 273; Oberg v.
Sanders, 111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229; Davis Stock Co. v. Hill,
2 U. 2d 20, 268 P.2d 988.

In a fraud case, Utah has adopted the rule allowing
the "benefit of the bargain" in damages rather than the
"out-of-pocket" rule adopted by the Restatement of Torts,
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Section 549. On this point, see Prudential Oil & Minerals
Co. v. Hamlin, 277 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.); Pace v. Parrish;
supra.; Beaver Drug Co. v. Hatch, 61 U. 597, 217 P. 695;
and Woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 274 F.2d 132 (10th Cir.).
Using this rule, the trial court arrived at the damages
award as against the defendants Geis and Smith that is
referred to above.
Even though the defendants Geis and Smith did appeal in this case from the judgment against them and in
favor of the plaintiffs, no briefs for them have yet been
filed in this case. It is therefore unknown upon what
grounds their appeal might be based. Plaintiffs' counsel
respectfully submits that there is no grounds for appeal
or for reversal on the part of these defendants and it is
very evident from the record that all of the elements of
fraud referred to above were proven by the plaintiffs and
that the trial court was justified in finding fraud, as he did,
by clear and convincing evidence.
The major factual points upon which the court relied
are set forth above in this brief under "Statement of Facts"
and will not be repeated here. It is true that certain of the
made by Geis for Smith to the plaintiffs
and to induce them to give up their property were promissory in nature and might not therefore serve, themselves,
s a basis for a finding of fraud as against the defendants
Geis and Smith. However, there were certainly many
r'.'presentations made which were not promissory in nature
?nd which constituted misrepresentations of then existing
material facts. For example, representations were made
about the success of the business up to that time in Cen29
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tral America that the trial court from the evidence could
well have determined were false and were known to be
false at the time made. The defendants also represented
to the plaintiffs a number of things about the way their
property would be handled. For example, the defendants
represented that they would put no greater lien against the
property than for $25,000.00, and they would not tie up
the property for more than ten years and that they would
not tie it up in such a fashion that parcels could not be released from it. There was ample evidence to justify the
trial court in believing that all of these representations
by the defendants were false when made and that defendants Geis and Smith then knew this.
CONCLUSION
On somewhat disputed evidence and after the most
conscientious review of both the evidence and the law, the
trial court sitting as the trier of fact, without a jury, found
that all of the elements of fraud had been committed by
the defendants Geis and Smith as against the plaintiffs and
in obtaining their property from them. After a similar
review, the court found that the defendant lntermountain,
although not actually a party to the fraud, had knowledge
and notice of most of the material portions of the trans·
actions as between the defendants Geis and Smith on one
hand and the plaintiffs on the other hand. The court further
found that the defendant lntermountain through its presi·
dent, Whiteley, knew of the limitations by which the de·
fendants Geis and Smith had obtained the property from
the plaintiffs and knew this before it loaned its $60,000.00
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and took the mortgage. Based on this evidence and the
law, the trial court found fraud on the part of the defendants Geis and Smith and that the defendant Intermountain was not a bona fide mortgagee for value and
without notice or that, in the alternative, it took the mortgage subject to the terms of the trust agreement by which
the defendants Geis and Smith had obtained the property
from the Robertsons. Accordingly, the court granted damages to the plaintiffs as against the defendants Geis and
Smith for fraud and a further judgment to the plaintiffs
:rnd third-party defendants voiding the mortgage held by
Inrermountain against their property.
The trial court having found and held as it did, its
decision must be affirmed if supported by competent evidence. The evidence in support of its decision was not only
competent, but overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiffs,
and it is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court
should affirm in full the findings, conclusions and judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
DAVID K. \VINDER
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents, Grant M.
Robertson and Edith L.
Robertson and Third-Party
Defendants and Respondents
John W. Robertson and
Zelda Robertson
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